Introduction
The non-truth-conditional aspects of declarative sentences (e.g. presuppositions, conventional and conversational implicatures, etc.) have extensively been studied in the area of formal semantics/pragmatics. However, those of questions are still less understood. In this paper I discuss one particular non-truth-conditional aspect of question meanings.
In the tradition of formal semantics, what is being asked by a question-i.e. the truthconditional aspect of question meanings-has been fruitfully analyzed in relation to the truth-conditions of (possible) answers, under the slogan "Knowing the meaning of a question is knowing its (possible) answers" (Hamblin, 1958 , 1973 , Karttunen, 1977 , Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984 , Krifka, 2001 ). However, questions may also convey information regarding the questioner's bias towards a particular answer, which is not amenable to an analysis solely based on the meanings of possible answers (Ladd, 1981 , van Rooy andŠafářová, 2003 , Romero and Han, 2004 , Asher and Reese, 2007 , Reese, 2007 . In this paper I focus on the biases conveyed by various types of polar (or yes/no) questions (PQs) in two historically unrelated languages, English and Japanese. My main goal here is the presentation of a description system that is fine-grained enough to characterize the flavors of bias that different forms of PQs encode.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I will show that Ladd's (1981) dichotomy of positively and negatively biased PQs in English is basically correct, but not detailed enough to characterize the intricacy of the non-truth-conditional inferences involved in various kinds of PQs. Building on Büring and Gunlogson's (2000) analysis, I will propose that two major types of bias should be recognized. In Section 3, I will demonstrate that the proposed system can nicely capture the biases of PQs in Japanese. Section 4 concludes the paper.
I am especially indebted to the two anonymous reviewers for detailed comments and highly helpful suggestions, which greatly improved the quality of this paper. I would also like to thank the audience of the workshop Expressives and Other Truth-Conditional Meaning as well as Eric McCready for invaluable discussions and comments. All remaining errors are solely my own.
Two Kinds of Bias in English Polar Questions
In English, as in many other languages distinct forms of PQs may have the same truthconditional meaning. For example, consider the following pair of sentences.
(1) a. Did John come to the party? b. Didn't John come to the party?
What these questions are asking about is exactly the same, namely whether or not John came to the party. However one perceives a glaring interpretive difference between them. Because what is being asked by the two PQs above is identical, this difference should lie in a non-truth-conditional aspect of their meanings. Simply put, negative polar questions with inverted negation (henceforth NPQs) such as (1b) obligatorily carry some information about the questioner's bias towards one of the answers that positive polar questions (henceforth PPQs) like (1a) do not.
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In this section, by closely examining inferences involved in PQs in English, I will claim that two qualitatively distinct kinds of bias must be recognized. Before proposing a new system, let us begin with Ladd's (1981) important classification of NPQs, upon which my analysis will be based.
ON-and IN-NPQs
Ladd (1981) makes an important observation that there are two readings of NPQs, which he calls Outside-Negation (ON) reading and Inside-Negation (IN) reading. The following examples modeled after Ladd's (1981) Here are intuitive characterizations of the meanings of the NPQs in these examples. In (2), the NPQ suggests that the speaker thinks there is probably a vegetarian restaurant around where she is, and is wondering whether this expectation is correct or not. On the other hand, the string identical NPQ in (3) implies that contrary to the speaker's initial expectation, she now thinks that there might not be a vegetarian restaurant, and asks for a confirmation of this negative supposition. In a nutshell, in (2), the speaker is biased toward the positive answer, while in (3), toward the negative answer. Interestingly, Ladd (1981) further observes that Positive Polarity Items (PPIs) and Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) disambiguate these readings. That is, when a NPQ contains a PPI, it only has an ON reading and when it contains an NPI, it only has an IN reading. This is demonstrated by the following examples with a PPI too and an NPI either respectively. (4) a. Didn't John come to the party too? ñ John probably came to the party. b. Didn't John come to the party either?
ñ (I thought he did but) John might not have come to the party.
Throughout this paper I assume this distinction is real and linguistically relevant, as strongly suggested by the above data, without committing myself to a syntactic or semantic analysis of the two readings.
In the remainder of this section, I show that although descriptively correct, the dichotomy of ON vs. IN-NPQs is too coarse to capture the intricate inferences involved in biased PQs. Building on Büring and Gunlogson's (2000) analysis, I will propose a system with two different kinds of bias, which I call epistemic bias and evidential bias. Simply put, epistemic bias stems from the speaker's private belief/expectation, while evidential bias has to do with evidence available in the current conversational context. I will demonstrate that these two notions are necessary and also sufficient to characterize the biases that are obligatorily associated with three kinds of English PQs, PPQ, ON-NPQ and IN-NPQ.
PPQs and Evidential Bias
Let us start with PPQs. I will demonstrate below that they are associated with a bias regarding evidence present in the conversational context. The relevance of evidence to the interpretation of PPQs has already been suggested by Büring and Gunlogson (2000) . As an illustration, consider the following example adapted from Büring and Gunlogson. (5) [ In the context of this example, it can be inferred from the wet raincoat that it is likely to be raining. This evidence suggests the negative answer of (5a) ("No, it's not sunny") and the positive answer of (5b) ("Yes, it's raining").
2 The infelicity of (5a) indicates that when evidence suggesting the negative answer (henceforth negative evidence) is available in the context, the questioner is not entitled to ask a PPQ. On the other hand, (5b) shows that a PPQ is perfectly compatible with evidence for the positive answer (henceforth positive evidence). Incidentally, PPQs are fine in neutral contexts where no evidence favoring either answer is available in the conversational context. This is shown in (6), taken from Büring and Gunlogson (2000) . (6 I assume the notion of contextual evidence due to Büring and Gunlogson (2000) :
Evidence that has just become mutually available to the participants in the current discourse situation
It should be stressed that an evidential bias is about evidence that is in principle available to all the participants in the current situation.
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To sum up so far, English PPQs carry [´negative] evidential bias, and are incompatible with contextual evidence for the negative answer. It should be emphasized here again that the importance of contextual evidence for the characterization of biased PQs has already been pointed out by Büring and Gunlogson (2000) , and in fact the descriptive generalizations proposed in this section about evidential bias can be regarded as a restatement of their proposal with a new jargon. A novel feature of my analysis is that there is another flavor of bias involved in PQs, to which I now turn.
[Context: You find a letter by a funding agency on the work desk of your colleague, and quickly glancing at it you can't help spotting words like happy, grant sum, etc. Your colleague has been away and is just coming back. You don't know that the letter was placed while he was away.] a.
Is it good news? b. #Is it bad news?
It is true that the evidence is yet not accessed by the hearer, but notice that it is readily accessible. I take this contrast to be showing that the mere availability of the evidence is enough for it to count as contextual evidence.
ON-NPQs and Epistemic Bias
In this subsection I will examine ON-NPQs with the notion of evidential bias proposed above, and claim that a different notion of bias is necessary for ON-NPQs. Recall that an ON-NPQ strongly suggests that the speaker is inclined toward the positive answer. The example in (2) is repeated here: (2) A: You guys must be starving. You want to go get something to eat? B: Yeah, isn't there a vegetarian restaurant around here? Moosewood or something like that?
As the following examples show, ON-NPQs carry [´positive] evidential bias, i.e. they are incompatible with positive evidence. Here, the positive polarity item too forces the ON-NPQ construal of the NPQ. Notice that the context?here is designed to satisfy the presupposition of too (Similarly for other examples below containing too or either ). (9) [Context: For a psychological experiment, we are looking for some left-handed subjects. We have asked some of our friends, but only Mary was left-handed so far. To my surprise, John is using a pencil with his left hand] a. #Isn't John left-handed too? b. Isn't John right-handed too?
In (9) the fact that John is using a pencil with his left hand is positive evidence for (9a), while it is negative evidence for (9b). The infelicity of (9a) indicates that an ON-NPQ is incompatible with positive evidence. Also an ON-NPQ is fine in contexts without contextual evidence, as illustrated in (10).
(10) [Context: We just learned that Mary is left-handed, and are wondering who else is. I think John, who is not here, is probably left-handed too, but I am not sure.] Isn't John left-handed too?
Here I would like to point out that the [´positive] evidential bias is just one aspect of the inferences that an ON-NPQ is obligatorily associated with, and it also necessarily implies that the speaker has an expectation compatible with the positive answer, or positive expectation. Conversely, if the speaker does not have a positive expectation, an ON-NPQ is infelicitous, which is demonstrated by (11).
(11)
[Context: We just learned that Mary is left-handed, and are wondering who else is. Given its rarity, I believe that Mary is the only left-handed person among us, so I think it's very likely that John, who is not around, is right-handed.] #Isn't John left-handed too?
Just as in (10), there is no contextual evidence about John's dominant hand, as he is not present in the context. The crucial difference between (10) and (11) is the speaker's expectation: in (11), the speaker thinks that the negative answer is probably true, and the ON-NPQ is infelicitous. More generally, an ON-NPQ Isn't p? necessarily implies a positive expectation p according to what the speaker believes. This is obviously a separate bias from the [´positive] evidential bias, which is also an obligatory component of the meaning of an ON-NPQ. Thus, an ON-NPQ carries two different kinds of bias at the same time. Roughly speaking, the two biases of an ON-NPQ express the conflict between the speaker's belief/expectation that p, and the lack of mutually available evidence supporting p.
Importantly, the speaker's positive expectation is obligatorily present with ON-NPQs but not with PPQs. This is illustrated by the contrast below. (12) [Context: You told me that you went to the party yesterday. I have absolutely no idea who else did] a. Did John go to the party too? b. #Didn't John go to the party too?
Here, the context makes it clear that the speaker's epistemic state is neutral with respect to who came to the party, and hence is incompatible with a positive expectation. The infelicity of (12b) indicates that it is an obligatory component of its meaning. Furthermore the felicity of (12a) shows that it is not a bias that all PQs are associated with. Thus I conclude that ON-NPQs necessarily carry not only a [´positive] evidential bias, but also a positive bias based on the questioner's belief. I call this type of bias epistemic bias.
(13)
Epistemic Bias If a PQ carries an implication compatible with the positive (resp. negative) answer based on what the speaker believes, the PQ is said to carry positive (resp. negative) epistemic bias.
Here the distinction between evidential and epistemic bias merits a further clarification. The two categories of bias can be understood as follows: Evidential bias is about contextual information available to all conversational participants, and hence is inherently public. On the other hand, epistemic bias is rooted in a private belief on the speaker's part ad need not be shared by other conversational participants.
One might wonder if evidential bias implies epistemic bias, as it is certainly conceivable that having some contextual evidence influence what the speaker believes.
5 I suggest here that the epistemic bias does not have to be based on the speaker's current belief state, but can be relative to what she believed before acquiring the contextual evidence.
It should also be noted that the 'modal flavor' of the epistemic bias is not always relative to the speaker's belief per se. For example, there are ON-NPQs that imply a positive expectation stemming from the norm/rules (deontic) or what the speaker desires (bouletic), rather than what the speaker believes to be true. Examples of these cases are given in (14), which are taken from Asher and Reese (2007) attributed to Huddleston & Pullum (2002) . (14) a. Deontic Aren't you ashamed of yourselves? Recall that ON-NPQs are just incompatible with contextual evidence for the positive answer and therefore perfectly felicitous in neutral contexts where no contextual evidence supporting either of the answers is available (cf. (10)). On the other hand, IN-NPQs require contextual evidence for the negative answer and are therefore infelicitous in neutral contexts, as shown by (17) 
Japanese PQs and Their Biases
Japanese PQs are formed from declarative sentences purely intonationally, i.e. with a rising intonation towards the end, or with the combination of a rising intonation and a question particle. There are a variety of question particles in this language, but in the present paper, I especially focus on two of them, -no and -desho, and contrast them with PQs without a particle. In (20a) is a declarative sentence whose PQ counterpart looks like (20b). The three PQs in (20b) share the truth-conditional meaning in that they all ask about the same thing, namely whether or not Mary came. Yet native speakers perceive a clear interpretive difference. I claim that the difference is one of biases that these PQs linguistically encode.
Before proceeding to the data of biased PQs, it should be noted at this point that Japanese also has a distinction between two readings of negative PQs. Moreover, as Aihara (2009) points out, PPIs and NPIs disambiguate them, just in the case of English. Abusing Ladd's (1981) terminology for English, I call them ON-NPQs (forced by PPIs) and IN-NPQs (forced by NPIs), 6 and treat them separately in the following discussion. In the examples to follow, we use dareka 'somebody' and other wh-KA phrases as PPIs and daremo 'nobody' and other wh-MO phrases as NPIs.
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In the remainder of this section, I will closely examine PQs without a particle and those with -no and -desho in this order. Each subsection starts with a summary table of the biases of PPQ, ON-NPQ and IN-NPQ, followed by a set of data verifying them.
PQs without a Particle
The following table summarizes the types of bias that Japanese PQs without a particle obligatorily carry. Notice that none of these combinations of the values appears in the Now let us turn to ON-NPQs without a question particle. They are infelicitous in negative contexts but fine in neutral and positive contexts. Also they obligatorily carry positive epistemic bias. For example, (23a) and (23c) necessarily imply that the questioner wants to go to a good restaurant and to a Japanese restaurant respectively. Here doko-ka 'where-KA' is a PPI and forces the ON-NPQ construal of the negative PQs.
IN-NPQs without a particle have [`negative] evidential bias and only felicitous in negative contexts, just like English IN-NPQs. However, they differ from their English counterparts in that they are not associated with any epistemic bias. For example, (24b) below does not necessarily imply that the questioner thinks there should or should not be someone else coming. Rather, it is just asking whether the negative evidence (A's utterance here) is true or not. Similarly for the others. In these examples, doko-mo 'where-MO' forces the IN-NPQ reading.
(24)
IN-NPQs without a Particle 8 These are bouletic readings. Epistemic and deontic readings are also available in appropriate contexts, but relevant examples are omitted for the sake of space.
9 I thank an anonymous reviewer for clarifying the importance of a context for this example. Comparing this table with the table at the beginning of the previous subsection, one notices that adding a question particle changes the biases entirely. But it does not the truthconditional meaning, so what is being asked stays the same. Therefore a question particle is void of truth-conditional import, but operates on a non-truth-conditional dimension of the meaning.
With the question particle -no, PPQs require positive evidence, unlike PPQs without a particle. This is illustrated by the following data. The following examples reuse the contexts from the previous subsection, and the PQs here are minimally different in that they have a question particle. The particle -desho changes the biases in a different way from -no. For example, PPQs with -desho carry strong positive epistemic bias, but no evidential bias. Thus they are perfectly felicitous regardless of the nature of the contextual evidence, and just imply that the speaker expects that the positive answer should be the case. In particular, with the PPQ in (30c) the questioner is trying to confirm his expectation that it is raining now, but since there is positive contextual evidence, the question sounds redundant to some extent. As mentioned already, the question particles do not add anything to the truth-conditional meaning of the PQ. Thus they contribute to a non-truth-conditional dimension of meaning. I have to admit here, however, that I cannot offer an analysis of the meaning of these question particles that uniformly accounts for the biases of the three kinds of PQs. Yet the complexity of the present phenomenon strongly suggests that at least part of the biases is grammatically encoded in the meanings of those particles, rather than derived from general pragmatic principles (contra van Rooy andŠafářová 2003, Romero and Han 2004; see Reese 2007 for a similar claim). Before closing this section, I would like to note that Japanese wh-questions have several options of question particles, just as PQs. At least the following three options are possible: without a particle, with no and with ka. Just as in the case of PQs, the three versions of the wh-question are truth-conditionally equivalent. That is, what is being asked is the same. Yet there are interpretive differences among them. This suggests that wh-questions in addition to PQs have some kind of bias. I defer a discussion of this to another occasion.
Conclusions
The data presented in this paper suggest that all English PQs are biased in some way, as previously suggested by Büring and Gunlogson (2000) , and furthermore that the same holds in Japanese. The main claim of this paper is that two different kinds of bias must be recognized to correctly characterize the inferences that a PQ encodes, namely evidential bias and epistemic bias. It was also shown that Japanese uses a different means from English in encoding biases, namely question particles. Yet, the flavors of the biases that PQs in these languages are associated with can be characterized by the combination of the same two parameters, evidential and epistemic biases. These empirical observations naturally lead to several theoretical questions. For example, why is it that all PQs are biased? In other words, why is there not a completely neutral question? One answer might be coming from the pragmatics of questions. As Ginzburg (1995) Another interesting open question is the distinction between ON-NPQ and IN-NPQ and the relevance of PPIs and NPIs. As Aihara (2009) observes and I replicated above, this distinction is not specific to English NPQs but can be observed in Japanese negative PQs. As the licensing of NPIs and PPIs is largely a grammatical issue, this suggests that it is not enough to just state what biases PQs have, but how the biases arise in grammar should be made clear (see Romero and Han 2004 for an account along these lines).
I cannot provide answers to these questions here. However, I hope that this paper expanded the basic observations and also deepened our understanding of the nature of the present phenomenon.
